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of Output Quotas in the Presence of Cheating
Konstantinos Giannakas and Murray Fulton
Abstract
This study builds on previous work by Giannakas and Fulton (2003, 2000) on the economics
of output quotas in the presence of cheating by examining the efficiency of the policy in trans-
ferring income to producers as well as the optimal regulatory response to enforcement costs and
farmer noncompliant behavior in a decentralized policy making environment. Analytical results
show that enforcement costs and cheating change the transfer efficiency of output quotas, the level
of intervention that transfers a given surplus to producers, the socially optimal income redistribu-
tion, and the social welfare from intervention. The incidence of the policy is shown to depend on
the relative political preferences of the policy makers and the policy enforcers making the con-
sideration of the decentralized policy making structure critical in analyzing output quotas in the
presence of cheating.
KEYWORDS: quotas, cheating, agricultural policy, distribution, welfare
1.  Introduction 
In a recent article published in this Journal, Giannakas and Fulton (GF hereafter) examine the 
optimal enforcement of output quotas in the presence of enforcement costs and farmer 
noncompliance with the provisions of the quota program. In particular, GF (2003) analyze the 
optimal enforcement of supply restrictions in a decentralized policy making structure that 
considers separately the decisions of the policy maker and the policy enforcer. The key (and 
rather counter-intuitive) result of their study is that program enforcement increases with the 
weight placed by the enforcement agency on producer welfare. This result stems from their 
finding that, while violation of the quota limit might be optimal for the individual producer that 
holds competitive conjectures, above-quota production depresses market price and producer 
welfare. Thus, an enforcement agency operating with the interests of producers in mind will 
restrict the very actions these producers would prefer to undertake.    
In this paper, we extend the work of GF (2003) to examine the efficiency of the policy in 
redistributing income to producers in the presence of cheating as well as the optimal regulatory 
responses to enforcement costs and producer noncompliant behavior. In particular, we examine 
the consequences of enforcement costs and cheating on the transfer efficiency of output quotas 
and on the level of the socially optimal policy intervention and income redistribution under the 
different policy enforcement scenarios analyzed in GF (2003).  
The transfer efficiency of output quotas in the presence of cheating has also been examined in 
an earlier article by GF that introduced enforcement costs and cheating into the economic analysis 
of output quotas. In particular, GF (2000) examine the ramifications of enforcement costs and 
above-quota production for the transfer efficiency of the policy in a centralized policy making 
environment where policy design and implementation are the responsibility of a single agency.   
In analyzing the transfer efficiency of the policy mechanism and the optimal regulatory 
responses to enforcement imperfections, this paper adopts the decentralized policy making 
environment introduced in GF (2003). This richer policy making structure, which considers 
separately the decisions of the policy maker and the policy enforcer, is required because 
differences in the political preferences of the two groups are shown to significantly affect the 
level of policy intervention and the incidence of output quotas.1 Similar to the previous papers by 
GF, the economic consequences of enforcement costs and cheating are considered in the context 
of a static, partial equilibrium, closed economy model. Since this paper builds on the results of 
GF (2003), an understanding of this earlier paper will assist in delving into the present article.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the effect of 
enforcement costs and cheating on the level of policy intervention (i.e., the level of output quota) 
that transfers a given surplus to producers of the regulated commodity. To do this, the next 
section looks at the problem of a regulator that desires to make a specific income transfer to 
agricultural producers under the different scenarios on policy enforcement (determined by the 
enforcement agency) considered in GF (2003). The section following links the surplus transfer to 
producers with the distortionary costs of market intervention to determine the efficiency of the 
policy in redistributing income in the economy under costly enforcement. Once the transfer 
efficiency of output quotas has been determined, the paper endogenizes the surplus transfer to 
producers – it considers the socially optimal income redistribution and the social welfare from 
intervention when enforcement is costly. While most of the analysis focuses on the case where 
penalties for quota violations are exogenous to the agency responsible for the enforcement of the 
farm program, for completeness of exposition, the implications of endogenizing penalties are 
discussed before moving to the concluding section of the paper. 
                                                 
1 As pointed out in GF (2003), by considering a centralized policy making structure, the analysis of GF 
(2000) implicitly assumes identical political preferences of the regulatory and enforcement agencies 
involved in agricultural policy making.  
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2.  Regulator and Optimal Intervention 
Consider first the case of a regulatory agency that desires to transfer a given surplus to producers 
of the regulated commodity. In the decentralized policy making environment considered in this 
paper, the regulator moves first and determines the quota level Q  that will achieve the desired 
income redistribution knowing the reaction functions of both the enforcement agency and the 
producers [given by equations (7)-(9) and equation (4) in GF (2003)]. In other words, this section 
analyzes the first stage of a three-stage game between the regulator, the enforcement agency and 
the farmers where the regulator decides on the level of Q  that transfers a given surplus to 
producers knowing exactly how this choice will affect the levels of enforcement and production. 
The optimal choices of the enforcement agency and the farmers (determined in the second and 
third stage of the game, respectively) are examined in GF (2003) and are known by the regulator.  
Note that, since output quotas involve surplus transfers from consumers to producers, a 
necessary condition for the adoption of the farm program is that the weight attached by the 
regulator on producer surplus exceeds the weight placed on the welfare of the regulated 
commodity consumers. Suppose that the political preferences of the regulator result in the desire 
to increase producer surplus to the level represented by the area BCDE in Figure 1, and that this 
surplus is smaller than the producer surplus corresponding to the monopoly output. In a world 
where cheating is perfectly and costlessly deterred, 
pce
Q in Figure 1 (where the superscript “pce” 
stands for “perfect and costless enforcement”) will be the quota level that achieves the regulator’s 
objective, i.e., it increases the producer surplus to the desired level BCDE. 
When the monitoring of farmers is costly, however, GF (2003) show that the levels of 
enforcement and production depend on the political preferences of policy enforcers. In general, 
the greater is the relative weight θ  placed by the enforcement agency on producers, the greater is 
the level of enforcement, and the lower is the above-quota production mQ . What we will show in 
this section of the paper is that, the greater is enforcement and the lower is cheating, the greater is 
the quota level that achieves the desired surplus transfer to producers. 
To show this result, consider first the case where the enforcement agency places relatively 
high weight on producer well being [i.e., cθθ ≥  in GF (2003)]. In this case, the audit probability 
(denoted as cθθδ ≥0  where the superscript stands for the weight placed by the enforcement agency 
on producer welfare) is set so that cheating is completely deterred [i.e., ncc 00 δδ θθ =≥  (where the 
superscript “nc” stands for “no cheating”) and 0=≥ cmQ θθ , see GF (2003)]. The relevant effective 
supply curve of the regulated commodity is depicted as the kinked cMPS θθ ≥+  curve in Figure 1. 
In such a case, an output quota set at cQ
θθ ≥
(
pce
Q≡ ) will be the optimal choice of the regulator 
that desires the specific increase in producer surplus, i.e., 
  
 BCDEQCQQpQ cccc =− ≥≥≥≥ )()(: θθθθθθθθ      (1) 
 
where p(•) is the market price of the regulated commodity and C(•) is the total cost of production. 
When the enforcement agency places a positive but relatively low weight on producer surplus 
[i.e., θ ∈(0, cθ )], GF (2003) show that complete deterrence of cheating is not economically 
optimal and some cheating will always occur (i.e., ncc 00 δδ θθ <<  and 0>< cmQ θθ ). The relevant 
effective supply curve is shown as the cMPS θθ <+  curve in Figure 1. Under a quota set at pceQ , 
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the above-quota production equals cmQ
θθ <  and total production equals c*Q θθ < ( cm
pce
QQ θθ <+= ). 
The corresponding market price is reduced and there is a surplus transfer from producers to 
taxpayers through the penalties paid on detected above-quota production (given by the shaded 
area G). Because of the increased production and the expected penalty, producer welfare is 
reduced relative to the “perfect and costless enforcement” situation for a quota set at 
pce
Q ( cQ
θθ ≥≡ ). Thus, for the desired increase in producer welfare to occur, the optimal quota 
when θ < cθ , denoted as cQ θθ < , should be less than pceQ . More specifically, cQ θθ <  will be 
given by:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] BCDEQQQCQQpQ ccccccc mm =+−− <<<<<<< θθθθθθθθθθθθθθ ρδδ '10***:  (2) 
 
where '1δ  is the exogenous component of the detection probability function and ρ is the penalty 
per unit of detected above-quota production [see GF (2003)]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Welfare Effects of Output Quotas With Cheating 
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Similarly, when the enforcement agency places no weight on producers and consumers (i.e., 
when 0==kθ ), enforcement is minimized and above-quota production is maximized for any 
given level of quota. The relevant effective supply curve is given by the 0==+ kMPS θ  curve in 
Figure 1. The quota level that would achieve the regulator’s objective is given as:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] BCDEQQQCQQpQ kmkmkkkkk =+−− ============== 00'1000000 ***: θθθθθθθ ρδδ       (3) 
 
Obviously, since cck θθθθθ δδδ ≥<== << 0000 (= nc0δ ) and 00 =>> ≥<== cc mmkm QQQ θθθθθ  for any given 
Q , it will always hold that cc QQQ
k θθθθθ ≥<== <<0 ( pceQ= ) – i.e., the level of output quota that 
transfers a given surplus to producers increases with an increase in the level of enforcement (and 
a reduction in cheating). 
Following these results, it is easy to determine the level of total production Q* (i.e., output 
quota plus above-quota production) when the objective of the regulator is to transfer a given 
surplus to producers. Crucial in determining the level of total production is the transfer from 
producers to taxpayers through the penalties paid on detected above-quota production.  
To show this, note that in a hypothetical case of no punishment for cheating, violation of the 
quota limit by farmers would only require the establishment of the quota such that the total 
production (output quota plus above-quota production) would be at the level that achieves the 
desired transfer to producers. When penalties are charged, however, there is surplus transferred 
from producers to taxpayers. Because of this transfer, the total quantity must be reduced further in 
order for the desired producer welfare increase to occur. In general, the greater is the transfer 
from producers to taxpayers, the lower is the total production of the regulated commodity. Since 
the expected penalty increases with an increase in cheating, it always holds that 
cc *Q*Q*Q k θθθθθ ≥<== <<0 ( pce*Q= ) – i.e., when the objective of the regulator is to transfer a 
given surplus to producers, total quantity produced increases with an increase in the level of 
enforcement (and a reduction in the level of cheating). A consequence of this is that consumer 
surplus falls with an increase in cheating when the objective of the regulator is to transfer a given 
surplus to producers. 
Overall, the analysis shows that both the quota level that transfers a given surplus to 
producers and the total output produced are greatest when both the regulator and the agency 
responsible for the enforcement of the quota program have a high weight attached to producer 
welfare. Both Q  and Q* fall with a divergence in the political preferences of the policy maker 
and the policy enforcer.  
Implicit in the above analysis is the assumption that the total surplus BCDE can be achieved 
by an appropriate quota under all scenarios concerning the enforcement agency’s political 
preferences and prevailing enforcement. However, this is not generally true; not all income 
transfers can be achieved under cheating. Consider the case where the government has a very 
high political weight attached to producer welfare and the targeted producer surplus corresponds 
to the monopoly one. When enforcement is perfect, this requires nothing but the establishment of 
the quota at the output level determined by the equality of marginal revenue with marginal costs.  
Under imperfect enforcement and cheating, however, this targeted level of producer surplus 
is not feasible. The reason is the transfer from producers to taxpayers through the penalties on 
detected cheating whenever above-quota production occurs. Thus, even if the quota was set such 
that the total, after-cheating production would equal the monopoly output, the producer surplus 
would be less than the one under perfect enforcement of the quota program. The difference would 
be the expected penalties on above-quota production. This constraint on the maximum possible 
surplus transfer under cheating could result in either the adjustment of the desires of the regulator, 
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or in the use of subsidy payments that would make up the difference between the desired and the 
feasible transfer under imperfect enforcement of output quotas [for a policy mix that combines 
supply restrictions with output subsidies in the presence of cheating see GF (2000)]. 
 
 
3.  Efficiency in Redistribution  
The previous section examined the ramifications of enforcement issues and the political 
preferences of policy makers and policy enforcers for the case in which the purpose of 
government intervention is to transfer a given surplus to producers of the regulated commodity. 
In this part of the paper the welfare losses from the program are explicitly linked to the surplus 
transferred to producers.  
In the interest group surplus space, the surplus transformation curve (STC) shows the trade-
off between producer surplus (PS) and consumer plus taxpayer surplus (CS+TS) for various 
levels of policy intervention. The slope of the STC, denoted as )( TSCSPSs += ∂∂ , is the 
marginal rate of surplus transformation. It shows the efficiency of output quotas in redistributing 
income to producers at the margin; how much of an extra dollar “taken” by consumers and 
taxpayers is received by producers. The inverse of s gives the marginal cost to consumers and 
taxpayers for transferring an extra dollar to producers, while one minus the absolute value of s 
shows the marginal welfare losses associated with the specific transfer. The closer is s to -1, the 
smaller are the welfare losses, and the greater is the transfer efficiency of the policy instrument.  
In a world where program enforcement is perfect and costless, the STC of output quotas is 
shown as pceSTC  in Figure 2. The pceSTC  is equivalent to the STC proposed in the traditional 
analysis of this policy instrument (Gardner, 1983; Josling, 1974). Point E in Figure 2 corresponds 
to the competitive output; the point of nonintervention. The pceSTC  is concave and reaches its 
maximum (slope of zero) at the level of quota that equals the monopoly output. Producer surplus 
increases at the expense of consumer surplus for output quotas set between the competitive and 
the monopoly output. Further restrictions on production result in losses for both producers and 
consumers. Since taxpayers are not involved in the surplus trade-off when enforcement is perfect 
and costless, the slope of pceSTC  can be written as pcepce CSPSs ∂∂= . 
Consider now the case where monitoring producers’ actions requires resources. Recall that 
when the weight placed by the enforcement agency on producer welfare is relatively high (i.e., 
cθθ ≥ ), cheating is completely deterred by an audit probability that equals nc0δ . Producer and 
consumer welfare are the same as in the “perfect and costless enforcement” case while the 
taxpayer costs are increased by the monitoring costs associated with nc0δ , i.e., (1+d)Φ( nc0δ ) 
where (1+d) is the marginal cost of public funds. The slope of the relevant STC, cSTC θθ ≥ , 
equals:  
 
      ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ncdCS PSTSCS PSs cccc 01 δ∂ ∂∂ ∂ θθθθθθθθ Φ++=+= ≥≥≥≥     (4) 
 
where cCS θθ≥∂ = pceCS∂ . 
The monitoring and enforcement costs result in reduced transfer efficiency of the policy 
instrument relative to the “perfect and costless enforcement” case. Since nc0δ  is a decreasing 
function of Q  [i.e., ρδ ))(( 110 QQab enc −−= ], the greater is the level of intervention (i.e., the 
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smaller is Q  and the further left from E we move), the greater is the audit probability that deters 
cheating. Increased 0δ  results in increased resource costs of monitoring and enforcement and 
reduced efficiency of the policy in transferring income to producers of the regulated commodity.  
Graphically, the increased enforcement costs result in a leftward elongation of cSTC θθ ≥  
relative to the pceSTC  with the horizontal distance between the two STCs reflecting the 
monitoring costs associated with nc0δ . Both curves reach a maximum at the same level of 
producer surplus i.e., the same level of surplus can be transferred to producers under both 
situations. 
 
 
    
       
  
   
 
  
  
             
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  STCs of Output Quotas Under Costly Enforcement [Low Φ(δo)] 
 
When, however, the weight placed on PS is relatively low [i.e., θ ∈[0, cθ )], complete 
deterrence of cheating is not economically optimal. Above-quota production occurs and some 
part of producer surplus ( ρR ) is transferred to taxpayers through the penalties paid on detected 
over-production [i.e., cccc mm QQR
θθθθθθθθ
ρ ρδδ <<<< += )( '10  when θ∈(0, cθ ), and 
00'
1
0
0
0 )( ======== += kmkmkk QQR θθθθρ ρδδ  when θ =k=0]. The slope of the cSTC θθ <  can be written 
as: 
0==kSTCθ
CS+TS 
SIC 
SIC’  ↑ SW 
cSTC θθ ≥  
pceSTC   
cSTC θθ <
PS 
0 
 
E
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    ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }cccccc RdCS PSTSCS PSs θθρθθθθθθθθθθ δ∂ ∂∂ ∂ <<<<<< −Φ++=+= 01   (5) 
 
while the slope of 0==kSTCθ  equals: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }0000000 1 ============ −Φ++=+= kkkkkk RdCS
PS
TSCS
PS
s θ
ρ
θθθθ
θ
δ∂
∂
∂
∂
 (6) 
 
where cc CSCSCS k θθθθθ ∂∂∂ ≥<== >>0 . 
Similar to the previous cases, when total production falls below the monopoly output 
producer surplus falls when θ ∈[0, cθ ). The consumer/taxpayer surplus is reduced initially but 
rises after the point is reached where the penalties collected on detected cheating exceed the 
resource costs of monitoring and the loss in consumer surplus. The result is the backward bending 
portion of the cSTC θθ <  and 0==kSTCθ  curves in Figure 2. 
As was pointed out in the previous section, the transfer ρR  from producers to taxpayers 
under imperfect enforcement implies that in order for a given surplus to be transferred to 
producers, the output level has to be reduced more than would otherwise be required. This 
reduction in total output results in increased distortionary costs of market intervention relative to 
the “perfect and costless enforcement” case. Moreover, the positive 0δ  that occurs when 
θ ∈[0, cθ ) means positive monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Because of the increased resource costs associated with a given transfer to producers the 
cSTC θθ <  and 0==kSTCθ  will lie underneath pceSTC  everywhere to the left of E. Hence, the 
most efficient income redistribution through output restrictions occurs in a world where policy 
enforcement is perfect and costless. The implication of this result [which is consistent with the 
findings of GF (2000) for the centralized policy making case] is that the traditional analysis of 
output quotas overestimates the transfer efficiency of this policy instrument by ignoring the costs 
associated with program enforcement.  
Consider next the relative transfer efficiency of output restrictions under the different 
political preferences of the enforcement agency when program enforcement is costly. The 
analysis in GF (2003) and the results in the previous section of this paper show that both 
enforcement and total production increase with an increase in the weight placed by the 
enforcement agency on producers (i.e.,  δ0θ =k =0< δ0θ <θ c < δ 0θ ≥θ c  and  Q*θ =k =0< Q*θ <θ c < Q*θ ≥θ c ). 
This finding implies that an increase in θ  will increase the transfer efficiency of quotas (i.e., 
| 0==ksθ | < | cs θθ < | < | cs θθ ≥ |) as long as the increase in monitoring costs (associated with the 
higher   δ0) is smaller than the reduction in the welfare losses from misallocation of resources (due 
to higher production). Thus, for any given market conditions, relatively low enforcement costs 
result in a   STCθ =k =0  that lies under  STCθ <θ c  which, in turn, lies under  STCθ ≥θ c  everywhere to 
the left of E (Figure 2). More generally, the lower are the enforcement costs, the greater is the 
likelihood that the transfer efficiency of the policy instrument increases with an increase in θ  for 
any level of market intervention.  
If enforcement costs are high, however, this result no longer holds. Since smaller values of θ  
mean less enforcement and smaller output levels,  STCθ =k =0  lies above  STCθ <θ c  which, in turn, 
lies above   STCθ ≥θ c . The reason for this ranking is that as θ  increases, the increase in monitoring 
costs is greater than the reduction in welfare losses that result from an increase in production. In 
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this case, the most efficient outcome emerges under allowance of cheating and its attendant 
decrease in total production. This is true for the range of intervention where the reduction in 
enforcement costs (due to reduced enforcement) outweigh the relevant increase in deadweight 
welfare losses. As long as the increase in the deadweight loss is greater than the reduction in 
monitoring costs,   STCθ ≥θ c  will eventually cross  STCθ <θ c  and  STCθ =k =0  from below (Figure 3). 
Note also, that because of the transfers from producers to taxpayers through penalties on detected 
quota violations, the maximum transfer that can be achieved when some cheating is allowed is 
always smaller than the maximum feasible transfer when cheating is completely deterred. Thus, 
  STCθ =k =0  and   STCθ <θ c  reach their maximum at a lower level of producer surplus than 
  STCθ ≥θ c (and   STC pce ). 
 
 
    
       
  
   
 
  
  
             
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  STCs of Output Quotas Under Costly Enforcement [High Φ(δo)] 
 
With this background, the relationship between transfer efficiency and the political 
preferences of the regulator and the enforcement agency can be summarized. When enforcement 
costs are low, the efficiency of output quotas in transferring income to producers is maximized 
when both the enforcement agency and the regulator place a relatively high weight on producer 
welfare.2 Interestingly, the transfer efficiency of the policy mechanism is minimized when the 
                                                 
2 Recall that, since output quotas involve surplus transfers to producers, a necessary condition for the 
adoption of the farm program is a relatively high weight attached by the regulator to producer surplus. 
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enforcement agency is not concerned with the welfare of producers and consumers but its 
objective instead is to minimize the taxpayer costs from cheating. The reason is the relatively low 
level of enforcement that results when the enforcement agency attaches zero weight to producer 
welfare. Since the costs of enforcement are less than the benefits obtained by having greater 
production, the most efficient outcome emerges under increased enforcement. 
While a disagreement in the political preferences of the policy maker and the policy enforcer 
is costly in terms of the transfer efficiency of output quotas when enforcement costs are low, this 
is not the case if monitoring costs are high. When enforcement costs are high, the costs of 
enforcement are greater than the benefits obtained by having greater production – thus the most 
efficient outcome emerges under relatively low enforcement. Since reduced enforcement occurs 
when the enforcement agency places a relatively low weight on producer welfare relative to that 
of the policy maker, the implication is that a lack of agreement in political weighting yields a 
more efficient outcome. 
Overall, the efficiency of output quotas in redistributing income to producers of the regulated 
commodity depends on the level of enforcement and the associated monitoring costs. When 
enforcement costs are low, the efficiency of output quotas increases with an increase in 
enforcement and the reduction in cheating. When, on the other hand, enforcement costs are high, 
the transfer efficiency of the instrument depends on the desired transfer to producers. For 
relatively small transfers, the transfer efficiency increases with a reduction in monitoring. 
Because there is a limit on the maximum income redistribution that can be achieved under 
imperfect enforcement, the transfer of a large amount to producers can only be achieved under 
complete deterrence of cheating. 
 
 
4.  Optimal Income Redistribution 
In addition to determining the consequences of cheating for the transfer efficiency of output 
quotas, the STC framework developed above can be used to determine the socially optimal 
income redistribution when enforcement of the quota program is costly. Consider the case where 
the objective of the regulatory agency is the determination of the surplus transfer to producers 
that maximizes some weighted social welfare function (SWF) (rather that the determination of the 
quota level that transfers a given surplus to producers). Assume that the political preferences of 
the regulator result in social indifference curves (SICs) similar to those graphed in Figures 2 and 
3, with the SWF value increasing with the northeast shift of the SIC [for the specifics of the SWF 
that gives rise to the SICs used in this paper see Gardner (1987)]. 
The socially optimal transfer to producers under the various levels of program enforcement is 
determined by the tangency of the SIC with the relevant STC (Gardner, 1987). In the relevant area 
for policy intervention through output restrictions (i.e., the area to the right of the point 
corresponding to monopoly output), the level of optimal total transfer to producers increases with 
an increase in the efficiency of the policy instrument in redistributing income. 
For any given set of SICs, the maximum transfer to producers will take place in an 
environment where cheating is perfectly and costlessly deterred. Since the transfer to producers 
under an output quota occurs through the market effects of the policy instrument, there will be 
less output produced under perfect and costless enforcement than when program enforcement is 
costly (i.e., the level of production under perfect and costless enforcement will be closer to the 
monopoly output). This finding implies that the traditional analysis of output quotas, by assuming 
perfect and costless enforcement of the farm program, inflates the socially optimal total transfer 
to producers, as well as the social welfare value from intervention. 
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When program enforcement is costly, both the socially optimal total transfer to producers and 
the social welfare from intervention increase with an increase in enforcement when enforcement 
costs are low. Put in a different way, when enforcement costs are low both the optimal transfer to 
producers and social welfare are maximized when the political preferences of the enforcement 
agency and the regulator coincide, i.e., when producer welfare is valued highly by those 
responsible for policy design and enforcement. On the other hand, when enforcement costs are 
high, the socially optimal transfer to producers and the value of SWF fall with an increase in the 
level of monitoring (Figure 3). Thus, when enforcement is relatively costly, both producers and 
the society would be better off in a policy making environment characterized by a divergence in 
the political preferences of the agencies involved in policy design and policy enforcement. 
 
 
5.  Extension of the Model - Endogenous Penalties  
To complete the analysis of the transfer efficiency of output quotas and the optimal regulatory 
responses to enforcement costs and farmer noncompliant behavior, it is useful to consider the 
policy outcomes in the limiting case where penalties are endogenous to the agency responsible for 
the enforcement of the program. Given the results of GF (2003) on the optimal enforcement of 
the policy when the enforcement agency has control over both audits and penalties charged on 
detected above-quota production, the implications of endogenous penalties for our analysis are 
straightforward.  
In particular, GF (2003) show that when penalties are endogenous to the enforcement agency, 
the optimal choice of an enforcement agency that places a relatively high weight on producer 
surplus will be the complete deterrence of cheating through the establishment of enormous fines 
for those caught violating their quota limit (and no monitoring). Since, in this case, enforcement 
of output quotas is perfect and costless, the quota level that transfers the desired surplus to 
producers, the transfer efficiency of the policy instrument, and the socially optimal income 
redistribution are those derived by the traditional analysis of the policy mechanism. This finding 
bolsters GF’s assertion that, “one interpretation of the assumption of ‘perfect and costless policy 
enforcement’ that is implicit in the traditional quota analysis is that enormous fines can be 
costlessly levied on producers that violate their quota limit” [GF (2003), p.13]. 
When, on the other hand, the enforcement agency places a relatively low weight on producer 
welfare, above-quota production occurs and the quota level that achieves the desired transfer to 
producers is reduced relative to the “perfect and costless enforcement” case. Total production is 
also reduced. Reduced production results in increased welfare losses from the misallocation of 
resources associated with a given transfer to producers and, thus in a reduced transfer efficiency 
of the policy instrument relative to the “perfect and costless enforcement” case. 
 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks  
This paper extends the study of Giannakas and Fulton (2003) on the optimal enforcement of 
output quotas in the presence of cheating by examining the efficiency of the policy in transferring 
income to agricultural producers as well as the optimal regulatory responses under the different 
enforcement policy scenarios considered in GF (2003). In particular, the paper examines the 
economic consequences of enforcement costs and producer noncompliant behavior on the transfer 
efficiency of output quotas and the level of the socially optimal policy intervention and income 
redistribution in a decentralized policy making environment. 
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Analytical results show that the introduction of enforcement costs and cheating changes the 
incidence of the quota program. By operating under the assumption of perfect and costless 
enforcement of quotas, the traditional analysis of the farm program overestimates the quota level 
that transfers a given surplus to producers, the transfer efficiency of the policy instrument, the 
socially optimal total transfer to producers, and the social welfare value from intervention. The 
magnitude of the changes due to cheating (and, thus, the incidence of output quotas) depends on 
the level of program enforcement which is determined, in turn, by the resource costs of 
monitoring producer compliance and the relative weights placed by policy enforcers on the 
welfare of the interest groups. On this latter point, when monitoring costs are high, a divergence 
between the political preferences of the policy maker and those of the policy enforcer results in 
larger and more efficient transfers to producers than would occur if the preferences were similar. 
When monitoring costs are low, this result is reversed and the larger and more efficient transfer 
occurs if both policy makers and policy enforcers have a relatively high weight attached to 
producer welfare. 
The results of this paper demonstrate that enforcement issues relating to output quota 
schemes have significant effects on income redistribution. They also bolster our previous 
arguments that enforcement costs and farmer noncompliant behavior cannot be a matter of 
indifference and need to be included into the economic analysis of the policy. 
Finally, it should be noted that, while our study provides insights on the economic causes and 
consequences of farmer noncompliant behavior, an empirical analysis of cheating on output 
quotas could make the analysis of the policy instrument under costly enforcement more useful in 
practical policy settings. Being constrained by data limitations, we leave this query open to future 
research. 
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